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Abstract 
This paper justifies the claim that orders on exchange rate derivatives, 
including forwards, swaps and options, have a place in exchange rate de-
termination. A simple option model based on Kyle (1985) is presented 
illustrating that option order flow informs traders about expectations of 
future exchange rates. The model is placed in a complete market where 
options are replicable thus conveying the same information as spot orders. 
A proposal is made that forward order flow has a variable impact on spot 
rates, depending on the extent to which they are used in hedging activities 
and must be treated separately to spot orders. Finally, the construction of 
FX swap order flow could be achieved by considering only the spot leg of 
the swap transaction as the forward leg in a swap is necessarily a hedging 
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\Vhilst spot order flow has become an increasingly popular tool in foreign ex-
change rate determination, derivative order flow l has been largely overlooked. 
Orders for Foreign Currency Derivatives such as forwards, FX swaps and options 
can inform the market about the future value of exchange rates. 2 Derivatives 
are relevant to foreign exchange microstructure, the field dealing in order flow, 
as the majority of trade in currencies, 70%, occurs in derivatives (Bank of Inter-
national Settlements, 2007). This paper deals with the extension of traditional 
microstructure theories of order flow to include foreign currency derivatives. 
The purpose is to justify the validity of derivative order flow and encourage this 
field of research. I offer the following primary findings: 
Option orders contain private information about the future value of the 
exchange rate as displayed in a model of European call option order flow 
based on Kyle (1985). 
This simple model predicts that call orders carry the same information as spot 
orders when in a complete market and can be used similarly in updating our 
expectations of exchange rates. A framework is presented which displays infor-
mational flows from option orders to exchange rates. The model differs from 
others in that it does not infer a preference for informed investors to utilize 
derivative instruments (Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas, 1998) nor does it rely on 
assumptions of incomplete markets (Back, 1993; Rzepkowski, 2003) in which 
option order flow carries unique (non-redundant) information on the exchange 
rate and is used to supplement traditional spot order flow. In this paper any 
redundancy is ignored, as, although option order flow is equivalent to spot or-
der flow, it may be more accessible to certain financial institutions. Options 
on currencies represent one of the fastest growing segments of the foreign ex-
change market and derivative trades in general significantly outweigh those of 
spot trades (Bank of International Settlements, 2007). 
[This may be the first usage of the term 'derivative order flow'. It is defined as an aggre-
gation of orders (transaction volume) for derivative contracts, signed positively for a purchase 
and negatively for a sale with respect to the initiator of the transaction. 
2 An exhaustive list of literature addressing derivative order flow includes Back (1993), 
Rzepkowski (2003) and Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas (1998). These papers address only option 
order flow, and only the last does so empirically. Froot & Ramadorai (2002), Bjonnes, Rime 
& Solheim (2004), Evans & Lyons (2005) and Gereben, Gyomai & Kiss (2006) include forward 
orders in their traditional spot order flow data. Only the last justifies or discusses this usage 











Both spot and derivative orders have a variable impact on exchange rates de-
pending on the extent to which they are used in hedging activities. Forwards 
represent a popular tool in hedging foreign exchange exposure and when used 
as such they will have no effect on exchange rates (Gereben, Gyomai & Kiss, 
2006). Forward order flow has been utilized informally in microstructure; most 
typically it is aggregated with spot orders (Bjonnes, Rime & Solheim, 2004; 
Evans & Lyons, 2005). This assumes that forward orders reflect on spot prices 
in the same way that spot orders do. 
I propose through a review of available literature that: 
There are differences in the extent to which investors use forward orders 
and spot orders to hedge, thus the information they convey is likely to 
differ. As such forwards must not be aggregated with spot orders to con-
struct order flow data. 
Finally, orders for FX swaps, in which the majority of foreign currency trans-
actions occur, do drive spot rates although there is currently no room in mi-
crostructure theory for them to do so; as a contract of both a spot and counter-
veiling forward trade, the resultant order flow is zero. I argue that: 
FX swaps can be incorporated, by considering only the spot leg of the swap 
transaction. This is justified as the forward leg is necessarily a hedging tool 
with no effect on the exchange rate. The principles of the Interest Rate 
Parity Theorem similarly confirm that only the spot transaction bears on 
the spot rate (Saunders & Cornett, 2005). 
This does not mean one should use only spot order flow. The spot leg of a swap 
transaction is unique to a spot order; the two are recorded separately by the 
Bank of International Settlements and by central banks. Papers that use spot 
data are not considering the spot leg of swap agreements and exclude more than 
half of all foreign exchange transactions. 
The structure of the paper presents these topics in the order presented above. 
In order to set the background, section 2 continues with a discussion of tra-
ditional microstructure models that is necessary in addressing derivative order 
flow (in particular, Kyle 1985 and Evans & Lyons 2002a). Section 3 follows with 











characteristics of information-revelation and inventory-control, forces which are 
responsible for price effects in the traditional spot models. Section 4 describes 
the foreign exchange market, its size and structure and section 5 presents the 
first primary finding on option orders. The following sections, 6 and 7, ad-
dressing forwards and swaps do not present results based on empirics, yet do 
present original proposals through evidence constructed in a review of available 
literature. 
2 Foreign Exchange Microstructure 
Exchange rate order flow is a measure of actual customer orders for exchange 
rates, observed moment by moment by the dealers who set rates. These indi-
vidual orders are signed from the perspective of the initiator to the trade and 
aggregated, usually into daily order flow. Thus, an overall positive order flow 
indicates net purchasing activity by customers during a day. Observing order 
flow offers a direct insight into the market and those willing to back their beliefs 
with cash. This private information has been for many years difficult for any 
non-dealer to access, and so, the research is relatively new. 
The classical approach to exchange rates focuses on fundamentals in the macro-
economy. It deals with the way exchange rates are affected by interest rates, 
money supplies and trade balances. Although this is intuitive it suffers from 
assuming that there is a uniform mapping between these variables and the ex-
change rate. It also assumes information about fundamentals is publicly known. 3 
The microstructure approach posits that not all news relevant to exchange rates 
is publicly known, not all market participants interpret news uniformly and 
trading mechanisms can differ in ways that affect price (Lyons, 2001). How-
ever, private information and customer sentiment can be determined; it is quite 
clearly displayed in the accumulation of customer orders on the screens of cur-
rency dealers. 
Information in microstructure is, paradoxically, of a macroeconomic nature. 
Fundamental variables are drivers of the exchange rate. In the traditional micro 
models, information about fundamentals is first transformed into order flow, 
3This thesis will avoid the well-documented debate over the classical approach. Neverthe-
less, it is worth looking at why the debate exists (Meese &0 Rogoff, 1983; Engel &0 West, 2004). 
Spot price movements appear to be determined to a large extent by the order flow process 











it then becomes a signal to price setters. In more recent hybrid models, in 
particular those used in empirical analysis, both the classical approach and the 
traditional micro approach are accommodated. Fundamentals can affect price 
directly or through order flow. With models that allow for both, the data can 
determine their relative importance (Lyons, 2001). 
Order flow is a variant of the term excess demand, although it is unique. 4 As 
expected, a buy order for an exchange rate leads to an increase in its price. 
There are two different branches of microstructure to explain this result, namely 
inventory-control and information-revelation models. The first relies on the risk-
averse nature of currency dealers. When customers exhibit buying behaviour for 
a foreign currency, dealers are compelled to raise its price so as to attract sellers. 
This ensures the dealer does not carry the risk of foreign exchange exposure. 
In this sense they are controlling their inventory of foreign exchange so as to 
maintain a zero balance. In reality, dealers in foreign exchange do attempt to 
close out their positions before the end of each day and hedge their exposure 
(Lyons, 1993). 
Information-revelation models assume there are individuals in the market with 
private information about the future value of the currency. Buy orders signal the 
belief by informed investors in a future appreciation. Given what they know, if 
they are willing to purchase the currency at the current price, it is undervalued. 
Dealers adjust prices upwards accordingly. 
The Evans & Lyons (2002a), three-stage model is put to use in a large portion of 
empirical papers on microstructure. It is worth explaining its design, as it will 
be discussed regularly in the paper. It is interesting to note how the framework 
of the model is somewhat true-to-life; it looks at the day-by-day operations of 
dealers in the market. A typical characteristic of microstructure modeling is the 
simulation of how real foreign exchange markets operate. 
The model is inherently an inventory-control one. Nevertheless there is room 
for customers to trade with private information. There are multiple currency 
dealers in the market, each with their own set of customers. A public signal is 
realized at the beginning of the day, visible to the price setting dealers. This is 
the payoff of holding foreign exchange, as determined by fundamental variables, 
such as interest rates, and it directly affects the price quoted. The customers 
40rder flow represents actual orders for an asset, while excess demand represents merely 












place orders with their dealers following a common price announcement in the 
market. Private information is embedded in these trades, allowing dealers the 
opportunity to observe the actions and the sentiment of a segment of the market. 
These 'round one' order flows are visible only to dealers with which they were 
enacted. They are not publicly observable. 
Dealers partake in 'round two' inter-dealer trading. Their risk aversion compels 
them to reverse the orders they took part in during round one. If their customers 
were net purchasers, they will purchase the same magnitude of foreign exchange 
in the inter-dealer market. At the end of the second round all dealers observe the 
net inter-dealer order flow, the sum of dealer-to-dealer trades and thus a function 
of round one customer trades. Through this there is information agglomeration; 
customer trades can be imputed by the efforts of their dealers to counterbalance 
them; dealers are able to 'observe' the actions of other dealers' customers This 
round was one of sharing dealer risk. Dealers each still hold a net imbalance 
shared between them. A third round occurs at the end of the day to afford 
dealers the opportunity to eliminate their overnight exposure entirely. 
Customers are encouraged into the third round to eliminate dealer imbalances. 
This is done by an increase or a decrease in the price of the foreign exchange. 
Net buying activity in round one would warrant an increase in price to attract 
sellers in round three. Accordingly, third round orders are equal to but opposite 
in sign of first round orders and aggregate customer order flow cancels itself out. 
Customers in the third round are termed liquidity traders and are on the 'pull 
side' of prices (Bj0nnes, Rime & Solheim, 2004). They provide liquidity to the 
market when it is needed. Customers of round one are termed speculators or 
aggressors and are on the 'push side'; they induce price changes. The model does 
not require that these two groups be different segments of society or the same, 
merely that there are customers willing to be aggressors or liquidity providers 
in the respective rounds. 
It is possible to utilize either inter-dealer order flow or customer order flow 
in empirics. Both are linearly related and are able to depict the net buying 
or selling behaviour of customers. Applying customer order flow, however, is 
non-trivial. It requires separating first round and third round orders, which 
by definition cancel each other out. Therefore, empirics do require that these 
market segments be defined. In practice the distinction is often drawn between 
financial and non-financial participants or foreign and domestic participants 











that the distinction can be drawn between spot and forward trading participants, 
where the latter represents the pull side. 
A far earlier model is that of Kyle (1985). It focuses on information-revelation. 
There is one informed investor in the market, one dealer and a multitude of 
uninformed traders. The dealer is responsible for setting price, and does so in 
order to protect himself from informed trades. The dealer also provides liquidity 
to the market. Gereben, Gyomai & Kiss (2006) provide an intuitive interpreta-
tion of this model. As the dealer is both a price setter and liquidity provider, 
he is in some way a representation of the dealers and pull side customers in 
Evans and Lyons (2002a). The customers in Kyle (1985) are then a represen-
tation of the push side of the market. This allows one to interpret an exchange 
rate response to customer order flow as either a result of inventory-control or 
information-revelation. 
IvIicrostructure theories are becoming popular amongst dealers. They use it 
not necessarily in forecasting, but in being aware that customer order flow is 
informative. Cheung & Chinn (2001) find that in a sample of 400 traders from 
Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore, 25% did so on the basis of customer order 
flow rather than through technical analysis, fundamentals or to earn on spreads. 5 
The large level of volatility in the Yen/Dollar exchange rate, which occurred in 
1998, is attributed to dealers reacting to portfolio shifts observed through order 
flow (Cai et aI, 2001). 
3 A Justification for Derivative Order Flow 
Literature on derivative microstructure is scarce. 6 Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss 
(2006) are the only authors to utilize a separate variable for forward order flow 
and examine its coefficient. 
Options are addressed in the discussions of Back (1993), Easley, O'Hara & 
Srinivas (1998) and Rzepkowski (2003). The first and last are solely theoretical 
in nature. Neither a theoretical nor empirical analysis of FX swap order flow 
exists. 
5Reference through Cai et al (2001) 
5Froot &: Ramadorai, 2002; Bj0nnes, Rime & Solheim, 2004; Evans &: Lyons 2005; Gereben, 











Despite this there is an abundance of research outside of microstructure look-
ing into how derivatives impact on the underlying price of an asset. The basis 
for this is the existence of incomplete markets. A complete market framework 
commonly assumes that investors are rational and share the same information 
(although these assumptions do not, in themselves, define a complete market). 
New information is factored into the price of financial instruments immediately. 
In addition there are no transaction costs. These requirements preclude ar-
bitrage opportunities in the market and price movements between derivatives 
and underlying assets are simultaneous (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006). When 
these requirements are not met derivatives can affect the price level and price 
volatility of underlying assets (Detemple & Selden, 1991). 
Research on derivatives and their effect on asset prices falls into the two cate-
gories of Direct-effect models 7 and Feedback models. These can be likened to the 
two ways in which spot order flow affects price; through information revelation 
and through inventory control of dealers. Direct-effect models and Feedback 
models could be described respectively as information-revelation and inventory 
control models as well. They do not utilize order flow and cannot be defined as 
microstructure, yet their conclusions support the notion that derivative order 
flow affects price in the same manner that spot order flow does. 
Considering information-revelation, information about the spot price can be 
revealed in derivative trades. Buying a call or selling a put are trades that 
benefit from a stock price increase. When there are informed investors in the 
market willing to hold these contracts, the trades carry positive information 
about future asset prices. Similarly, selling a call or buying a put carries negative 
information about future stock prices (Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas; 1998). 
Information revelation in derivative markets may precede those in spot markets 
when informed investors prefer to deal in derivatives rather than underlying 
assets (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006). Reasons for informed investors to prefer 
derivatives include the ability to leverage the price movement of the underlying 
with a small capital outlay in derivatives. One can implement complex strategies 
through trade in a single derivative that replicates the payoffs of many assets. 
Derivatives can increase the benefit of obtaining information by increasing the 
number of investment opportunities (Cao, 1999). This leads to greater levels of 
71 have provided this definition for lack of a general name. The term 'Direct-effect' is used 











information acquisition by all. When informed investors acquire more precise 
private signals (through the availability of derivatives) the overall risk of the 
underlying goes down and its price increases. In addition, underlying price 
volatility is reduced as better-informed investors are less surprised by public 
information announcements. 
If a derivative security is replaced in a market by a synthetic one, the loss of 
the derivative results in the loss of important information (Grossman, 1988). 
For example, portfolio insurance involves the purchase of a put, the right to sell 
an asset, in case of a future depreciation. Puts can be replicated by a holding 
of cash and futures. If this 'synthesized' security replaces puts the market no 
longer has access to put prices. A high put price indicates a large number of 
investors with a strategy such as, "sell assets if their value falls below 25%." 
They therefore inform us now about the fraction of people ready to leave the 
market in the future. Without puts the underlying assets future price volatility 
can rise because of a current lack of information about the hedging activities 
that are in place. 8 
Grossman (1988, pg 278) considers the information in derivative prices but not 
in derivative orders. Yet his thesis has parallels with microstructure, "The ex-
istence of a traded security (derivative) will aggregate information regarding 
future trading plans which is currently dispersed among investors." Microstruc-
ture models describe the aggregation of dispersed information through the ob-
servation of order flow. 
The above direct-effect models all support that information-revelation occurs 
through the trade in derivatives and through their observation by market par-
ticipants. Feedback models deal with 'information-free' trading (Deutsche Bun-
desbank, 2006). These models can be likened to inventory-control models of 
microstructure; trade in derivatives induces inventory-control behaviour (where 
a trader minimizes foreign exchange exposure) in the form of delta hedging. 
Specifically, the models focus on the effect dynamic hedging of option positions 
has on the underlying asset. The replication of a derivative has no effect on 
spot prices in complete markets, but the trade on the spot market needed to 
hedge the derivative does. One holds the underlying asset to neutralize the delta 
of the derivative. Dynamic hedging, maintaining a perfect hedge over time, is 
8Grossman's paper was published only two years after the Dow Jones Crash of 1987 where 
many people blamed portfolio insurers for inciting sell strategies. Instead of buying puts, they 











attributed in some models with a resulting upward push on underlying asset 
volatilities (Frey & Stremme, 1997). 
Feedback effects have been applied to Derivative Order Flow as described by 
Rzepkowski (2003). Risk-averse dealers in foreign exchange who are unwilling 
to hold overnight positions attempt to offset their exposure before the end of 
the day. The spot market does this as in the typical three-stage Evans and 
Lyons model; dealers set a price so as to sell/purchase 'spot' imbalances back 
to customers. As such it is an example of an inventory-control model. In 
the call market, dealers do not sell surplus options back to the market, they 
embark on a delta-hedging strategy which involves buying or selling an amount 
of the underlying currency. Ultimately, the spot market is affected by risk-averse 
dealers in both the spot and options markets. 
Derivatives carry implications for spot prices. They do so through the same 
channels that traditional order flow does, namely through information revelation 
and inventory control. This is true too in Derivative Microstructure models such 
as Back (1993), Rzepkowski (2003) and the model to be presented below. 
The following section describes the market that microstructure theory simulates; 
namely the real dealers, customers and trading floors where foreign exchange 
transactions take place. This gives context to the model of call orders which 
follows and is presented for this purpose. In addition, I intend to make explicit 
the gap in traditional theory that is being filled, considering that turnover in 
derivative markets far outweighs that in spot markets. 
4 Foreign Exchange Spot and Derivative Markets 
Turnover in the foreign exchange market is enormous and the greatest number 
of trades are in derivative products. In April 2007 global foreign exchange trans-
actions averaged $3.3 trillion per day (Bank of International Settlements, 2007) 
. Spot trades, which occur by definition within 2 days, amount to $1 trillion. 
The majority, $2.3 trillion, is made up by the derivatives market, dominated 
by foreign exchange swaps (see table below) 9 In the last three years growth in 
foreign exchange has taken off as depicted in the second last column. Overall 
9 Foreign exchange swaps involve two legs to the transaction. A spot trade is made for a 
currency whilst an offsetting forward agreement is entered into simultaneously. This differs 












daily trades have increased by 74% since 2004. The biggest growth areas are 
FX swaps and options with growth in turnover within the period of 81.6% and 
81.2% respectively. Spot trades grew at a slower pace. 
Global OTe Foreign Exchange Turnover 
Daily Averages in April, in billions of US dollars 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 %incr. 2007 
Spots 394 494 568 387 621 61.8 1005 
Derivatives 382 643 959 854 1290 79.8 2320 
Forwards 58 97 128 131 208 74 362 
FX Swaps 324 546 734 656 944 81.6 1714 
Currency Swaps 10 7 21 52.4 32 
Options 87 60 117 81.2 212 
Total 776 1137 1527 1241 1911 74 3325 
Bank of International Settlements, 2007 
Currencies and Foreign Currency Derivatives (FCDs) can be traded 24 hours a 
day except on weekends and holidays and trades occur in a decentralized world-
wide marketplace. The market for FCDs began with other derivatives in the 
1970s in Chicago, London and Philadelphia where listed futures, calls and puts 
could be found (DeRosa, 1998). Dealers were primarily floor traders and spe-
cialty shops. Since then most of the market for currency derivatives has moved 
into major commercial banks where most of the spot foreign exchange market 
operates. Citibank, Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, Bank of America and Barclays 
Capital are primary examples. These major dealers had some advantages in 
derivatives trading that facilitated this move. DeRosa (1998) outlines technical 
expertise, specialized staff and investments in risk technology as strengths of 
the banks. Large dealers benefit over their smaller counterparts because it is 
cheaper and less time consuming to hedge a large portfolio; many of the po-
sitions in the book offset each other and provide counter-veiling movements in 
delta. Additionally, proximity to the spot market aids derivative trading as it 
allows for easier delta hedging through purchases of the underlying. 
Customers of foreign exchange are made up of the non-financial sector and the 











pension funds and hedge funds. Non-financial customers have businesses requir-
ing foreign exchange transactions; those involved in trade and foreign investment 
for instance. Allayannis & Weston (2001) find that out of a sample of 720 US, 
non-financial companies with assets worth more than $500 million as early as 
the period between 1990 and 1995, approximately 37% used foreign currency 
derivatives. The exporting proportion of this group had a higher percentage 
of FeD usage at 60%. Geczy et al (1997) found that of the 372 non-financial 
Fortune 500 companies in 1990, 41% had used a currency derivative such as a 
swap, forward or option. 
1\'1ost of forex trade occurs between the large banks in what is known as the 
inter-bank market; inter-dealer trade to theoreticians. According to the BIS 
report (2007), the growth in inter-bank transactions increased proportionately 
to previous years but was far outstripped by the growth in dealer trades with 
customers. Nevertheless inter-dealer trades still dominate. 43% of traditional 
foreign exchange occurred between reporting dealers in 2007, down from 53% 
in 2004. 40% occurred between a reporting dealer and non-reporting financial 
institutions and 17% occurred between dealers and non-financial customers. 
5 A Model of Call Order Flow 
The following model is an example of information-revelation in derivative order 
flow. It follows closely the model of Kyle (1985) where spot orders for an asset 
cause dealers to adjust prices accordingly, yet alters it to deal in European call 
option orders alone. 
The model is a single auction equilibrium and does not include sequential or 
continuous trades as seen in Kyle (1985). It reveals the flow of information 
from order flow of the derivative to the expectations of market makers about 
spot exchange rates through the following two outcomes: 
The expected value of ST, the value of the underlying currency at the end of 
the call contract, is related positively to order flow of call options. Therefore, 
as more customers buy calls on the currency the expected value of the currency 
rises for the market maker who deals the options and observes the order flow. 
The variance of ST, conditioning on the information given by order flow, is lower 











The model achieves a simple justification for the consideration of options in order 
flow analyses. It differs from alternative models in that it ignores a discussion 
on the redundancy of derivative assets in complete markets. There are benefits 
and costs to such an approach; the overall justification is that it focuses on the 
possibility of extracting information from option trades which are numerous in 
the market and growing in prevalence. This would benefit any institution with 
greater access to option rather than spot orders. 
It also assumes away the need for more complicated data, including structural 
characteristics of the option such as delta, as required in incomplete markets. 
Rzepkowski (2003), based in incomplete markets, concludes that there is a non-
linear relationship between call orders and rates dependant on these character-
istics. Back (1993) uses a similar model to the one below, although it includes 
trade in the underlying asset, to show that through the presence of traded deriva-
tives, the market is inherently incomplete. These papers outline the weakness of 
my approach, the information derived from options is only comparable to spot 
orders when markets are complete and indeed that may not be the reality. This 
is discussed further at the end of the section. 
5.1 Model Assumptions 
5.1.1 Participants 
In this framework, three types of participants trade European Call Options. 
These are a single informed trader, I, many uninformed traders, U and a market 
maker, M. The informed has full knowledge of the final value of the currency 
underlying the call option. Time is measured from the beginning of the call 
contract until its expiry at time T. 
5.1.2 Orders 
Trading takes place over two steps. In the first, the informed trader and the 
uninformed traders simultaneously decide the quantity of call options they will 
trade, placing orders for these quantities with the market maker. The unin-
formed can be termed noise or liquidity traders and they trade randomly with 
orders following a normal distribution. They enter the call market in order to 











currency and its final value, ST. The quantity of options traded by the informed 
is denoted i. The quantity of options traded by the uninformed is denoted e 
and is distributed normally, e ~ N (0, a;). The sum of e and i is market order 
flow, d = e + i. 
5.1.3 Information 
The informed trader chooses their order i in order to maximize profits based on 
full knowledge of the final value of the currency. The uninformed are only aware 
that the final value of the currency is distributed normally as, ST ~ N (0, a~). 
The random variables ST and e are independently distributed. 
The orders of the informed are indistinguishable from the uninformed so they 
are disguised from the market maker. This prevents the market maker from 
conditioning solely on informed orders, which would eliminate the ability of the 
informed to make profits. In addition, both informed and uninformed traders 
are unaware of each other's actions. 
5.1.4 Player's Behaviour 
The informed trader sets i so as to maximize profit given their knowledge of the 
final value of the currency. The market maker sets the strike price, K, so as to 
earn zero profits due to free entry of competing market makers. 
The market maker, upon receiving order flow d, sets the strike price of the 
options sold. This is a departure from the usual case, typically option writers 
choose a premium and offer a range of strike prices, hedging their positions 
through investments in other assets. 
In this framework there is a fixed premium of zero through the zero profit un-
der free entry condition and it is reasonable to imagine a market maker setting 
the strike instead. With a zero premium, the writer is more exposed to foreign 
exchange risk; option contracts represent a zero-sum game. They reserve the 
right to offer a single strike they calculate will avoid losses. Offering a single 
option contract to the market, with no variance in the choice of term to matu-
rity or strike afforded to the customer is an extreme form of standardization. 
The standardization of contracts offered to markets is reminiscent of Exchange 











benefits to the dealer in standardizing as described by Stulz (2003). This in-
cludes economies of scale as well as a greater degree of liquidity and reduced 
risk. This model assumes a fully standardized option contract, in the face of a 
zero-premium condition. 
5.2 Analysis 
Equilibrium in the model is defined such that for the choices of, i and K, there 
is both profit maximization of the informed trader and there is market effi-
ciency (Kyle, 1985, p. 1318). Market efficiency requires that dealers set prices 
competitively.l0 These conditions are given in the following statements. 
5.2.1 Profit maximization of the Informed 
The informed trader chooses i such that no alternative i' results in a higher 
expected profit, conditional on the knowledge of the final value of the currency. 
Where 7r[ is the profit of the informed and D[ is the information set of the 
informed inclusive of 5T : 
(1) 
As is standard for a European call option the profit of the informed trader 
is equal to the max of zero and the difference between the final value of the 
currency and the strike price multiplied by the number of contracts taken out 
by the informed. 
7r[ = Max ((5T - K) i; 0) (2) 
5.2.2 Market Efficiency 
The market maker sets the strike in order to earn zero profits, knowing that 
there is free entry of competing market makers. Therefore the strike is set equal 
to the expected value of the exchange rate conditional on d. 
10 Kyle (1985) confirms that the condition can be achieved by simulating a Bertrand auction 
game between at least two risk neutral market makers. This would result in a zero profit 
condition of the market makers who attempt to compete for their customers and drive prices 











K = E(STld) (3) 
In the instance of a positive order flow from the informed, if the market maker 
were to set a strike below the expected future value, the market maker would 
incur losses. If he was to set it above the expected future value the informed 
trader would lose and instead choose a competing market maker who offers a 
lower strike price (one who is willing to take less profits). 
5.2.3 Remarks 
The interaction between the market maker's problem and the informed trader's 
problem is made clear in equations 2 and 3. The market maker's pricing rule 
depends on the contribution of i to order flow d, but the informed trader's choice 
of i depends on the impact orders have on the market maker's price K (Lyons, 
2001). A unique linear equilibrium is achieved in the results of proposition 1 
below. Intuitively an informed investor expecting the following pricing rule will 
maximize profits with the following trading rule. A market maker expecting the 
following trading rule will set the strike price according to the following pricing 
rule. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Proposition 1 
There exists a unique equilibrium in which the pricing and trading rules are 
linear functions given by: 
K = E(STld) = wd 
i = aST 
Where wand a are: 
1 
w=-














a= (~) (7) 
Equation 4 states that as more customers buy calls on the currency the expected 
value of the currency rises for the uninformed market maker. The pricing and 
trading rules depend on the same two parameters, the variance of the uninformed 
order and the variance of the final value of the currency. This is a consequence 
of the two being jointly determined (Lyons, 2001). 
5.3.2 Proof 
The proof relies on assuming behaviour for the informed trader and market 
maker which can then be shown to satisfy the equilibrium conditions. The 
informed investor assumes a strike price, set by the market maker, as K = 
E (STld) = wd. The variable w is a coefficient mapping the order flow to the 
strike price. The important assumption is that the informed trader assumes 
the market maker utilizes a linear strike price rule. Applying this to the profit 
function, whilst expanding for d, one gets: 
7rI=(ST-w(i+e))i (8) 
The informed trader will only participate by going long on a call if he knows 
ST to be sufficiently high as to earn profits. He will also participate by shorting 
calls when ST is known to be sufficiently low; the model assumes away instances 
where the informed trader does not exercise the option. 
Taking expectations leads to equation 9. This is due to the normal distribution 
of e, with a mean of zero, the independence of e and i, and the knowledge of 
ST by the informed. 
(9) 















The market maker assumes the linear trading rule of the informed is given by 
i = (tST. The market maker will apply this assumption to the above maximizing 
condition, which he can determine by working through the optimization problem 




The market maker uses the observation of order flow as a signal for the final 
value of the exchange rate. Applying the linear trading rule of the informed to 
the equation of order flow, d = e + i, one gets: 
d = O'ST + e (12) 
As a linear combination of jointly normally distributed variables, it too is nor-
mal. Therefore: 11 
2 
nITs 
E(STld) = 2 2 2·d 
ae +0' as 
(13) 
Coupled with the strike price rule of the market maker K = E (STld) = wd, one 
gets the following: 
w = 2 2 2 




Solving 14 and 11 simultaneously results in equations 6 and 7 from proposition 
1. 
5.3.3 Proposition 2 
The variance of ST after observing order flow is lower than the variance of ST 
before the order flow signal. 
(15) 
11 Using a general equation for conditional mean (Grossman &; Stiglitz, 1980; see the ap-
pendix for its application): 












This follows as ST and d are jointly normally distributed. 12 The second term 
on the right of 15 is necessarily positive so the variance of ST is reduced when 
conditioning on order flow d. 
Decreased price volatility due to information-revelation in derivative trades is 
supported in other models (Detemple & Selden, 1991; Cao, 1999; Grossman, 
1988; and Rzepkowski, 2003) In opposition are the feedback models, for instance 
Frey & Stremme (1997) in which price volatility rises due to derivative trades. 
The finding of lowered volatility is consistent with the majority of empirical 
studies, as discussed in Cao (1999). At times there is ambiguity when there is an 
overall reduction in volatility in the markets in general, irrespective of derivative 
trades. When adjusting for this effect there may be no or little change in 
volatility but in all cases at least a downward movement. In all of the discussed 
empirical papers there is no finding of an increase in volatility through the 
inclusion of derivative contracts. 
5.4 Remarks 
5.4.1 Put Options 
Put options are unique in microstructure because they defy a traditional as-
sumption in this field. Buy orders for spots and most derivatives necessarily 
have a positive effect on the exchange rate. Buy orders for puts necessarily 
have a negative effect on the exchange rate. They can be termed negative-news 
trades (Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas, 1998) as they benefit from a decrease in spot 
price and will be held when there is an expectation of depreciation. The above 
model can be derived for put options where the purchase of a put lowers the 
expected future value of the exchange rate. In empirical application negative 
and positive news trades cannot be aggregated together due to their opposite 
effect on rates. 
12Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980 












5.4.2 From Expectations to Price 
The transfer mechanism between the dealer's updated expectations of the spot 
price and the actual spot price is not implicit. This is because the dealer is a 
derivative trader, not a spot trader as in the original model. They set strike 
prices, not asset prices in the market. The model achieves a transfer mechanism 
between the dealer's updated expectations of the spot price and the strike price 
of options; strike prices rise to meet the expected future value of the exchange 
rate at the end of the option's life. This is interesting but not central; the 
important conclusion is that the observation of derivative order flow is the cause 
of updated expectations of the spot price, amongst derivative dealers. 
No assumption has been made about whether derivative dealers deal in spot 
markets, there is no appearance of spot trades in this framework. In any subse-
quent period to T, the dealers may enter the spot market taking their updated 
expectations with them. Market makers who have observed call orders could 
bring the expected future value of the spot rate with them to the spot market, 
setting the price of the currency equal to this expectation as in Kyle (1985).13 
That call market makers deal in spot markets is a realistic assumption consid-
ering that derivative market makers often operate in the same institutions that 
deal in the traditional exchange (DeRosa, 1998). These dealers are often repre-
sentatives of a large dealer bank and in a position to operate in the spot market. 
Alternatively if traders remain exclusively in the derivative market they are in a 
position to inform their counterpart spot traders who operate within the same 
institution. Derivative traders outright inform their spot traders, allowing them 
to update their expectations about the spot market leading to a reflection in 
price. These assumptions could be explored further, yet they are unnecessary 
when considering only complete markets. 
5.4.3 Complete Markets 
A complete market is defined in the assumptions surrounding the Black Scholes 
(1973) model, the standard derivative pricing theorem. What is important to 
this framework is that the derivative is perfectly replicable or redundant so that 
the payoffs of the derivative can be replicated perfectly by a portfolio of the 
13The assumption of free entry of competing market makers holds in Kyle (1985) and the 










underlying asset and the risk free asset. (For the redundancy of derivatives in 
complete markets see Bjork, 2004 and Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006). 
In a complete market, it is not necessary to assume any transfer mechanism 
between expectations and price at all. One would find no difference between 
the expected value of the exchange rate determined through order flow in either 
call or spot markets. A call market maker would learn from this call order flow 
what a spot market maker would learn in spot order flow; this concept has given 
rise to the term redundant derivative. 
One cannot dismiss the informational flow of derivatives in such instances. For 
institutions with a freer access to derivative order flow it can be used in the same 
way as traditional order flow; it is just as informative. This point is important to 
the thesis that derivative microstructure is justified and valid. The simple model 
provided above posits that option order flow can be used instead of spot order 
flow in forecasting exchange rates. In an instance where a financial institution 
observes a large option order on a currency they could use this information 
to update expectations and account for its effect on their own exchange rate 
exposure. The traditional model would have the financial institution ignore 
the option order on the grounds that it reflects the same information in spot 
orders, not considering that this spot information may be slower coming to the 
institution or simply unavailable to it. 
Where this simple model fails is in instances where markets are incomplete and 
derivatives are non-replicable. With no transfer mechanism to spot prices, it is 
not clear that these expectations will be reflected in the actual exchange rate. If 
informed trades cluster in option markets rather than spot markets an expected 
value of the exchange rate will be communicated to option dealers, which differs 
from that communicated to spot dealers (Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas, 1998). 
Back (1993) and Rzepkowski (2003) treat derivative order flow as something 
which is additive to the information received in spot order flow, as opposed to 
an equivalent. Only when the information between derivative and spot orders 
differs, as in an incomplete market, does it have scope to inform. This can 
be termed the order flow's differential information content (Easley, O'Hara & 
Srinivas, 1998). The level of differentiation is affected by structural charac-
teristics of the option contract, which can change over time (Rzepkowski 2003). 
Thus, option order flow has a variable impact on exchange rates. The non-linear 











complete markets less easily applied empirically as it requires greater data on 
such structural characteristics for each trade. I assert that the pertinent struc-
tural characteristic is delta in both information-revelation and inventory-control 
models. 
Back (1993) shows that an informed trader purchasing a call contract signals to 
the market the increased probability that the final value of the currency will be 
greater than the strike price. Orders for calls would do this disproportionately 
relative to orders for the stock as long as it is not associated with an affine 
payoff, as long as it has differential information content. 14 The model installs a 
non-affine structure by calling on an intuitive aspect of option trading. The price 
pressures of stock and call orders become approximately equal when it becomes 
likely that the option will finish in the money. The pressure from option orders 
becomes nearly zero when it becomes likely that the option will finish out of the 
money (Back, 1993, p. 444). Imagine a scenario where the currency price is far 
below the strike and the time left in the contracts life is short, not even large 
bets made on calls on the currency will convince others of a rapid appreciation. 
One could say the value of information in these orders is low. 
Although not defined as such in the paper, this is a delta effect. When an 
option is deep out of the money it has a near-zero delta and when deep in the 
money it has a unit delta. Orders for calls which have a large delta carry greater 
information than those with a small delta. Easley, O'Hara & Srinivas (1998) 
confirm a delta effect in the information-revelation context. Delta is calculated 
as a function of the leverage of the option (the number of shares 'controlled' by 
the option). The higher the leverage, and the delta, the greater is the profit 
to informed trading. Thus information-based trades will be drawn to options 
markets with a high delta. When delta is zero, no informed trades cluster 
in option markets resulting in complete market conditions (the order flow of 
options and spots do not differ in the information they can provide). 
The most recent contribution to derivative microstructure, Rzepkowski (2003), 
makes this explicit in the inventory-control context, as has been discussed. It 
builds upon the standard three-stage model by Evans & Lyons (2002a). The 
model is extended by allowing customers to trade in call options on the currency 
in addition to the currency itself. In the 'third round' of trading dealers elimi-
nate their foreign exchange exposure to options by taking on a counter-veiling 












position in the spot currency. The quantity of the exchange rate that creates a 
perfect hedge is delta of the options. 
Any position in options held by a dealer, which has a high value for delta, 
regardless of sign, will result in a high quantity of the spot being traded to 
liquidity traders. A similarly high price response will be necessary to induce the 
traders to take on these positions. 
The empirical application of option order flow on exchange rates thus requires 
the consideration of delta and those factors which affect delta. 
In the Black & Scholes (1973) model of option pricing (Garman & Kohlhagen, 
1983, for foreign currency options) delta of a European option is a function of 
the domestic risk free rate, the foreign risk free rate, the length of the option 
contract and the variance of the underlying foreign exchange rate. Delta is also 
a function of the foreign exchange rate at the beginning of the contract and 
the strike price. In order to hedge option positions in the spot market, as in 
Rzepkowski (2003), one must hold the delta multiplied by the 'leverage' of the 
contract; the amount of foreign exchange the option affords the holder the right 
to buy or sell. 
Thus, there are numerous structural characteristics that would find their way 
into models of this form (they have, as yet, remained untested empirically). 
Outside of a debate between the validity of assumptions in these models and 
my own, one will find a stark difference between the complexity of the two types. 
The simplicity of the above model may better encourage empirical research in 
option order flow and sets out an idealized setting, as a starting point, where 
this has been bypassed in the literature. 
Worth mentioning, two variables that affect delta are present as variables in 
typical order flow regressions. The first, spot price, the dependant variable, 
pushes delta of a long call upwards, increasing the effect of call orders. The 
second is the foreign risk free rate which is commonly used as an independent 
variable in hybrid models (Evans and Lyons, 2002b) and this too affects delta. 
This suggests that endogeneity and multicollinearity would be introduced with 












I now move on to a discussion of forward orders, which make up a little over 
10% of world foreign exchange turnover. These contracts allow the writer to 
purchase a currency at least two days in the future at a rate decided today. 
In this section I set out the argument that forwards differ from spot orders 
sufficiently that they must be aggregated separately in constructing order flow. 
This goes against the trend set in three recent papers. 15 
Outside of these three, and with the addition of Gereben, Gyomai and Kiss 
(2006), it is uncommon to see the use of forward order flow. The inclusion of 
forwards within models typically dealing with spot orders is done so without 
consistent method across all four. The papers fail to justify the chosen aggre-
gation method between both types of trade. There appear three methods of 
incorporation; to discount forward rates to spot rates, to aggregate forwards 
with spots outright and, lastly, to keep forwards and swaps separate. The last 
method is the correct one as it avoids grouping liquidity trades with speculative 
trades that drive prices. The tendency for institutions to utilize forward orders 
as hedging tools results in them having no effect on exchange rates. Only spec-
ulative trades, which create foreign exchange exposure, cause rate changes: an 
informed trader hoping to profit from an exchange rate transaction must create 
foreign exchange exposure (Saunders & Cornett, 2005). Easley, O'Hara & Srini-
vas (1998) confirm that if options are used as hedging vehicles, then their trades 
are liquidity based and un-informative. They represent third round trades in 
Evans and Lyons (2002a), having no effect on rates. 
There is evidence that strongly supports that firms, especially non-financial 
firms, use FCDs for hedging purposes and not for speculation (Allayannis & 
Ofek, 1998). Forwards can be efficiently utilized in hedging operational risk 
where payments are frequent and indefinite, a characteristic familiar to non-
financial firms (Geczy et ai, 1997). 
Through aggregation one cannot distinguish between a spot or forward purchase 
of a currency. This is reasonable for speculators who would be indifferent be-
tween spot and forward contracts. A 'round trip' has a speculator buy a foreign 
currency, benefit from its appreciation and then buy the original currency back. 
This could be done by instead purchasing a forward contract on the foreign 











currency and upon its exercise purchasing the original currency back. Hedgers 
however typically distinguish between spots and forwards. Hedging involves 
eliminating foreign exchange exposure completely. If a hedger purchased a spot 
foreign currency, they would undertake to sell that currency in the future for a 
determined rate through a forward contract. In this instance spots and forwards 
will be negatively correlated. 
In Froot & Ramadorai (2002) the aggregation of forwards and spots requires 
grouping together contracts of different expiry, which is described as a source of 
confusion. The forward orders they have are thus discounted to their value at 
signing using the local-currency interest rate between signing and settling. This 
method is standard in pricing forward contracts (Hull, 2005). 
Complications arise in choosing interest rate data and through its availability. 
Transactions whose calculated present values are more than $1000 000 or 30% 
different to the future value are excluded in case the disparity was created in 
inaccurate discounting. This may needlessly exclude genuine forward contracts 
with large deviations between spot and forward rates. In addition, there is little 
difference to the new data, as nothing fundamental has changed except the 
readjustment of the purchase/sale price by some factor. This may not warrant 
the added complications. 
The second method, outright aggregation, ignores that spot and forward orders 
have different dates of expiry. Evans & Lyons' (2005) paper on the forecasting 
power of micro models does just this, utilizing forward flows in aggregate with 
spot flows. This is done without discussion. Presumably future and spot con-
tracts are aggregated according to their day of signing. More importantly, this 
method assumes that the effect on exchange rates of spot and forward orders 
are alike. Evans & Lyons (2005) is a popular paper and groundbreaking, in that 
it achieves explanatory power of medium term exchange rates so far unachiev-
able in macro models. It also forecasts the exchange rate more accurately than 
other papers. On this basis a much more comprehensive discussion of the use 
of forward orders is warranted. 
In a similar light Bj0nnes, Rime & Solheim (2004) aggregate spot and future 
orders, albeit with more discussion; they note that to use spot orders alone would 
give a distorted picture of the risk participants are willing to take. Nevertheless, 
their conclusion avoids a discussion on the influence of the forward contracts, 











To explain why one must understand the primary finding of Bjonnes, Rime 
& Solheim (2004): non-financial participants are liquidity providers (hedgers) 
in the overnight currency market. Financial participants are the aggressors 
(speculators) and initiate trades and price effects. Drawing an analogy with 
Evans & Lyons (2002a), financial customers trade in round one and non-financial 
customers absorb dealer risk by taking on overnight positions in round three. 
The theory is supported by the findings that a) The order flow of non-financials 
(financials) is negatively (positively) correlated with changes in the value of the 
currency, i.e. non-financials purchase during recessions and b) financial orders 
Granger-cause non-financial orders. 
In practical terms, assume financial customers participate more often in foreign 
investing activities whilst non-financial customers participate in trading activ-
ities. If the former demand Krona for investment in attractive Swedish assets 
the positive order flow will appreciate the Krona. Non-financial traders will be 
attracted to now relatively cheaper European goods and sell the Swedish Krona 
for Euros. Their sell orders for the currency come with its appreciation. As a 
result there is a negative correlation between non-financial order flow and the 
exchange rate. 
Bj0nnes et al (2004) also find a significant negative correlation between spot 
and forward orders for all participants, financial and non-financial. Those who 
purchase spot orders tend to sell forwards and those who sell forwards tend to 
purchase spots. This represents hedging behaviour by all participants, although 
some segments of the market may hedge more than others. The distinction 
drawn between financial and non-financial customers might instead be a dis-
tinction between spot and forward purchasing customers. Spots might be the 
push orders in the market whilst forwards are the pull orders. 
Non-financials may be hedging their positions more often than financials are, 
by selling forward orders to counteract their holding of foreign assets. As a 
result, non-financials are liquidity providers because of their liquidity trades in 
forwards. If forward orders are the true signal of liquidity trading, rather than 
the proposed financial, non-financial distinction, the results of the paper will be 
inaccurate: 
Through aggregation an element of the financial order flow, that composed of 
forwards, is liquidity providing although it has been assigned to the push side 











assigned to the pull side, although it does have an effect on exchange rates. 
I suggest there is a push pull differential in the above paper due to the vary-
ing information content of spot and forward traders, as forwards are used in 
non-informative hedging activities. This conclusion cannot be determined con-
clusively unless forward and spot orders are separated just as non-financial and 
financial orders are. At the least, my suggestion highlights the point that ag-
gregated forward and spot orders leave uncertainty as to whether this is the 
case. 
Fortunately Gereben, Gyomai & Kiss (2006), the fourth of the above-mentioned 
papers to utilize forwards, provides a detailed analysis of segregated forward and 
spot flows making it possible to determine whether these trades have differential 
effects. 
In the paper, there are nine distinct order flow variables; Spots from both do-
mestic and foreign banks and non-banks, forwards from both domestic and 
foreign banks and non-banks and finally, spot orders of the central bank itself. 
Correlation analysis shows that, in general, foreign and domestic firms' spot or-
ders are negatively correlated. Overall the paper expects and finds a push pull 
distinction between foreign and domestic participants. They do not explicitly 
investigate one between spots and forwards yet strong evidence of this arises 
and can be extrapolated. 
Confirmed in the paper, forward market order flow variables have no push-type 
impact on the exchange rate. "It seems that the primary channel that aggregates 
information about the future value of the currency is the spot market," (Gereben, 
Gyomai & Kiss, 2006). In the liquidity-providing pull customer regression (in 
which no push trades should be included), forward orders from domestic non-
financials are highly significant, resulting in a considerable improvement in R2. 
The coefficient suggests that purchases of forwards are associated with depre-
ciation in the currency, as to be expected on the pull side. This is associated 
with non-financial institutions. What is occurring is an apparent preference in 
the market for investors to use the spot market for speculation and the forward 
market for liquidity trades and hedging, especially amongst non-financials. The 
precedent set by Gereben et al. (2006) is to ensure spot and forward orders are 
kept separate as they do indeed have differential information content. 
In order to formally define the push and pull equations one must run what 











al (2006). The process is unique as the distinction between spot and forward 
orders is allowed to weigh on which types of order flow constitute the push and 
pull sides. The method is as follows: a correlation analysis is run between all 
individual forms of order flow, which are aggregated according to, for instance, 
foreign/domestic (F /D), financial/non-financial (b/n) and spot/forward (s/f).16 
The paper in discussion includes spot orders of the central bank (Cb), one could 
include forward orders by the bank. This results in ten sources of order flow, x. 
x = (Fbs, Fns, Dbs, Dns, Fbf, Fnf, Dbf, Dnf, Cbs, Cbf) (16) 
A regression is run of order flows on the exchange rate as in 17. From the basis of 
evidence in the correlation analysis and the regression the push and pull orders 
are selected. This is done through knowing that push and pull customer orders 
are negatively correlated and the push (pull) coefficients in the regression will 
be positive (negative). 
(17) 
One final check would be to summate all push order flow and ensure that it 
is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to pull order flow. An equation 
meant to define the effect of spot and forward orders on the exchange rate must 
include only those orders which are positively correlated with the rate (the 
push side) as microstructure provides only a positive effect from buy orders, 
in both information-revelation and inventory-control specifications. The same 
holds true for models that forecast, although this was not adhered to in Evans 
& Lyons (2005) who did not allow for differential information content between 
spots and forwards. 
7 FX Swaps 
Institutions regularly use FX swap instruments to attain currencies without 
exposing themselves to foreign exchange risk. The FX swap has already been 
described as the most abundant form of foreign exchange trade globally. It is 
composed of two opposite trades, a spot and a forward, for the same quantity of 











foreign currency. The resultant effect on cumulative order flow is therefore zero. 
Thus the microstructure approach allows no room for it in theory or in practice. 
Both spot trades and forwards have been integrated into empirical analysis but 
when combined into a swap contract they have been excluded. 
It is possible, however, for an institution to participate in a swap agreement 
which contains information about an exchange rate change. For instance a 
swap order can be made to profit from interest rate spreads between nations, 
which may not be widely perceived by the market. This provides a causal 
relationship between order flow for swaps and the exchange rate, which has 
not been accounted for. An example by Saunders and Cornett (2005) on swap 
purchases illustrates this clearly. 
Take an American bank that can earn more on loans it provides to British 
citizens, then to citizens of America. If the bank is able to borrow for less than 
it can earn through loans, it will be able to profit in either market, yet the 
British one is subject to exchange rate risk. By entering into a swap agreement 
to purchase pounds today and sell them back at a future date, all exchange rate 
risk is avoided. The other participant in the deal may request a discount on the 
spot rate such that in the future, when they are to buy pounds for dollars, they 
have to pay less than they would today. The American bank on the forward 
agreement makes a small loss, yet a large gain is made in the interest rate 
spread between borrowing and lending available in Britain. Thus the financial 
institution will partake in further loans to the British market. This requires a 
greater number of swap transactions; a greater number of both spot and forward 
contracts. Increasing demand for spot orders on pounds means the spot rate 
for pounds would rise. Increasing forward sales of the pound would lower the 
forward rate. This widening of the forward-spot exchange rates makes hedging 
strategies less desirable, until the point where no excess return is received on 
the foreign strategy above borrowing and lending domestically as dictated by 
the interest rate parity theorem. 17 It is important to note that in this model it 
is only the spot transaction that affects the spot exchange rate, not the forward 
transaction. 18 
Bj0nnes et al ( 2004) say, "A swap is by definition a position that nets itself out. 
171nterest Rate Parity Theorem (8 - borrowing L - lending) (Frenkel, 1976) 
1 + rlj = s~ [1 + rtl .F 
18 A swap can be either a combined spot/forward or a forward/forward, they are considered 











In other words, we can ignore trading in swaps." In light of the above example 
one should not ignore swaps. The example shows a macroeconomic variable, 
foreign interest rates, create a desire for a swap transaction with a resultant 
effect on spot price. This has not been allowed in standard order flow as it is 
assumed that spot and forward orders, the two legs of the swap transaction, 
have the same effect on spot rates and cancel each other out. As argued in the 
previous section, this need not be true. To incorporate their effects the matter 
of their zero net order flow must be addressed. 
Microstructure signs trade from the perspective of the initiator to the deal. 
When entering into a swap, this is likely the same person for both legs of the 
transaction. In a special example, the participant may approach the market 
maker for a spot transaction and the market maker, unwilling to carry exposure, 
insists on an equally sized forward contract. Both the customer and the dealer 
initiate separate legs of the transaction. This would generate a non-zero order 
flow equal to twice the value of the spot transaction (much like turnover figures), 
signed positively in favour of the customer. One could assume this scenario 
holds, yet there is no reason for it to be typical of all swap transactions. 
An alternative is to utilize the spot component of the swap alone as it may 
be only this component that affects price. The example of Saunders and Cor-
nett (2005) supports this approach; in returning to the equilibrium of IRPT, 
increasing demand for forwards does not affect the spot rate, it only changes the 
forward rate. As discussed, evidence from Gereben et al. (2006) supports this; 
they find forward order flow has no significant push side effect and no effect on 
the spot rate. This need not be true in all cases of forward orders, although 
it is true when the forward is used as a hedging tool on the pull side. In this 
instance, I propose, one can extract the spot order from the swap transaction. 
There is a justification for both spots and forwards to be positively correlated 
with exchange rates; speculators in the market could reasonably purchase a 
spot or forward contract in expectation of an appreciation. In the discussion on 
forwards this required defining the nature of the forward, as a speculative tool 
or one for hedging, before considering its inclusion. An FX swap is necessarily 
entered into as a foreign exchange hedging tool. Extracting spot trades from 
swaps is thus justified along these terms. 
A more certain approach would be to run an extended diagnostic check on the 











orders are discovered to be aggressive and price setting, whilst forward orders 
are primarily liquidity trades, one has evidence that the same holds true in 
swap contracts. To further this, if financial institutions compose a large degree 
of the swap market, this alludes to hedging behaviour. Financial firms utilize 
swaps as a hedging tool often and more so than non-financial firms (Geczy et aI, 
1997). Swaps can be customized to eliminate basis risk to a greater degree than 
forwards, and due to the fixed costs associated with this, it is cheaper within 
a single swap than a series of forwards. 19 This suits financial institutions with 
predetermined foreign exchange debts. 
8 Conclusion 
The focus of this analysis has been on customer order flow models in foreign 
exchange microstructure and the inclusion of derivative orders within this frame-
work. Three derivatives compose the majority of derivative trades on foreign 
exchange and represent two-thirds of total turnover in FX markets (Bank of 
International Settlements, 2007). These are FX swaps, forwards and options 
and they are addressed by this paper. 
The evolution of the field of microstructure is bound to continue in the manner 
in which it began. The field attempts to model as realistically as it may, the 
manner in which real market makers receive market information and adjust 
prices accordingly. The modeling of derivative order flow is the next step, as 
evidenced by the prevalence and continuing rise of derivative products in the 
market for foreign exchange. The approach I have taken in this paper, in the case 
of options, is to take an existing traditional model of Kyle (1985) and include in 
it orders for European call options. A process of information-revelation occurs 
through the observation of option order flow, which updates the expected future 
value of the exchange rate. The strengths and weaknesses of the model rest on its 
simplicity. It indicates that option orders are as informative as spot orders when 
in a complete market, providing a justification for this form of derivative order 
flow. This is relevant to those institutions with greater access to option data or 
those that observe large option orders before they do spot orders. A weakness is 
that it fails to address the variable impact of option orders in incomplete markets 
19Sasis risk is generated when there are differences between the asset that needs hedging 
and the derivative contract that is used to hedge it. The risk arises in that the final value of 











through the value of delta. Rzepkowski (2003) demonstrates this effect. What 
is left is for this to be tested empirically for the first time. 
In the case of forwards I have discussed the rationale and method used by 
recent empirical papers that incorporate forwards in traditional models. The 
theoretical foundation of forward order flow is not treated differently to that 
of spot order flow. As such the above-mentioned papers perpetuate a trend of 
assuming the two can be aggregated together. Gereben Gyomai and Kiss (2006), 
the most recent, separates the two. This is necessary in that any difference in 
the choice amongst investors to use forwards or swaps in either speculative 
or hedging behaviour will cause the two instruments to lie on different sides 
of the push/pull divide defined by Bj0nnes, Rime & Solheim (2004) (price-
driving/liquidity-providing orders). In this paper, I propose that forwards are 
commonly used in hedging activities and likely to have a reduced effect on 
exchange rates. In other words they are liquidity providing. Though this may 
not necessarily be true for all markets and currencies, it must be allowed for by 
keeping spot and forward orders separate. 
This complication has positive implications for the utilization of FX swaps in 
order flow analysis. As a contract of two equal and opposite trades, its order 
flow is necessarily zero and under current theory it will have no effect on rates. 
Yet the principles of the Interest Rate Parity Theorem indicate that swaps do 
induce changes on spot rates (Saunders & Cornett, 2005). It is the spot leg of 
the transaction that impinges on spot rates, not the forward leg. In considering 
that forwards have no effect on rates when used in hedging activities, as is 
necessarily true for an FX swap, one can justify the use of FX swap order flow 
constructed from the spot leg. 
A drawback of the rarity of order flow data, as well as that of derivative orders, 
is that the various hypotheses made have not been tested empirically in this 
paper. Given the opportunity to do so, the following questions would test the 
primary findings: 
Does call order flow explain exchange rate changes and what is the effect of delta 
on this relationship? Are forward orders negatively correlated with exchange 
rates such that they represent liquidity trades in the market? Can the spot leg 
of FX swap transactions explain movements in the exchange rate? 
In calculating daily turnover statistics, central banks receive daily orders for 











ability to construct spot and derivative order flow variables. 2o This offers the 
ability to forecast exchange rates (Evans & Lyons 2005), determine the segment 
of the market that drives rates and determine which segments respond to such 
price changes (Gereben Gyomai & Kiss, 2006). Incorporating derivatives in 
order flow analyses would allow researchers to determine which instruments are 
the first to carry private information and which are the most pertinent to rates. 
It would also greatly expand the proportion of foreign exchange transactions 
enacted each day that can be incorporated in microstructure models. 
20 The South African Reserve Bank collects daily data from banks on spot, forward and swap 
transactions for the Rand in order to compute net average daily turnover in South African 
foreign Exchange. This is published in the Quarterly Bulletin of the SARB (datasets 5450M 
to 5461M). The (private) raw data could be used to construct spot and derivative order flow, 












With respect to Proposition 1 and 2 
To Show: 
Given: 
d = aST + e 
E (STld) = E (ST) + C~;:tl) . [d - E (d)] (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980) 
E(ST) = 0, E(d) = 0 
Proof: 
Cov (ST, d) = E [ST - E (ST )]. [d - E (d)] 
= E[ST.d] 
= E [ST, (nST + ell 
= aE [Sf] 
= a.a} 
Var (d) = E [d - E (dl]2 
= E [o:ST + e]2 
= E [e2 + o:2S} + 2o:STe] 
Therefore: 
2 
E (STld) = ,r"T; 2.d 
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